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LAWRENCE JARETT'
IT is a confounding fact that American admiralty law grants greater material
reward for saving cattle in danger at sea than people in similar jeopardy.
In The Dalzellea, for example, a tugboat was awarded $6,000 for salvage
services to a cattle float having a net salved value of over '$86,000.1 Well
over three-quarters of the salved value, however, was contributed by the
worth of some 3500 animals. If the salvor had saved men, women and
children instead of animals, his reward would have been based on the value
of the damaged float alone. And if this float had sunk, he would have been
turned away by our courts without a penny, despite a successful rescue of
passengers and crew, since a life salvage award, if granted, is dependent
upon property being saved.2
The life salvor is a problem of law and morality.3 The general maritime
law, like the common law, "does not compel active benevolence between man
and man," and "it is left to one's conscience whether he shall be the Good
Samaritan or not."4 Although the most elementary instincts of humanity
seemingly impose a duty to assist those in distress on the watery highways
of the world, it was not until 1910 that the great maritime nations of the world
agreed to put legal compulsion behind this obvious moral obligation." In that
year the International Salvage Convention proposed the imposition of a duty
upon each ship master, "so far as he can do so without serious danger to his
vessel, her crew and passengers, to render assistance to everybody, even
though an enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost."0 Fulfilling its re-
sponsibility as a Convention signatory, the United States enacted this proposal
t-ember, New York Bar. Associate Professor of Law, United States Merchant
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1. 12 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
2. See 1 Noams, THE Law OF SEAM1EN §§212, 237 (1951).
3. Life salvage may be defined as a reward given by law, from reasons of public
policy, humanity and commerce, for saving human life in danger at sea. See Dunlop,
Life Salvage, 15 Scot. L. REv. 44 (1S99).
4. Ames, Laui, and Morals, 22 Hnv. L. Rwv. 97, 112 (1903). The failure of admiralty
to develop an equitable award rule for the life salvor becomes less shocking if one surveys
judicial and jurisprudential discussion devoted, with unsatisfactory and conflicting results,
to the problem of reconciling moral considerations and legal obligations. See CArmozo,
THE PA.AwxF.os OF LEGAL SciENcEs 25 (1928); ROBINSON, HANDOOK OF ADMU-LTY
LAw 722 n.44 (1939) ; Allen, Legal Duties, 40 YALE L.J. 331 (1931).
5. See Standard, International Conventions and the Rights of Scanm, Passngcrr
and Shippers, 5 LAw. Guiu REv. 363 (1945).
6. INT'L SALVAGE CoNvEnnoN Art. 11 (1910). The Convention also provides that
"the owner of the vessel incurs no liability by reason of contravention of" Article 11,
ibid.; and that "The High Contracting Parties whose legislation does not forbid infringe-
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into the Salvage Act of 1912, providing for the fining and imprisonment
of violators. 7 But while a master is threatened with a criminal penalty for
failing to save the lives of others, performance of this duty does not bring him
material reward. Moreover, there is no provision for repayment of any
loss the master, shipowner, or crew may suffer in saving lives., That mari-
time law should reward the property salvor, but not the life salvor, is a para-
dox that requires an examination of the fundamental elements of the salvage
concept in general, and the life salvage concept in particular.
An analysis of the innumerable salvage definitions reveals that at least three
basic elements must be present to support the validity of a salvage claim.
First, there must be a service to maritime property 9 which is in real or
impending danger.10 Secondly, the service must be voluntary in nature.11
Thirdly, there must be at least partial success in saving property, or a
proximate contribution to the ultimate success.12  Behind the concept of
meats" of Article 11 "bind themselves to take or to propose to their respective legis-
latures the measures necessary for the prevention of such infringements." Id., Art. 12.
For a full text of the treaty, see 6 BENEDICT, ADmIRALTY 200 (6th ed., Knauth, 1941).
7. Section 2 of that Act states: "That the master or person in charge of a vessel
shall, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his own vessel, crew, or passengers,
render assistance to every person who is found at seas in danger of being lost; and if he
fails to do so, he shall, upon conviction, be liable to a penalty of not exceeding $1,000 or
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or both." 37 STAT. 242 (1912), 46
U.S.C. § 728 (1946). See Warshaver v. Lloyd Sabado S.A., 71 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cer,.
denied, 293 U.S. 610 (1.934) (shipowner not liable for master's failure to render assist-
ance). See RonInCSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 723.
8. In this regard, see Article III of The Aviation Salvage at Sea Convention of 1938
which contains provisions relative to giving "a right to an indemnity in respect of ex-
penses justified by the circumstances and of losses suffered in the course of the opera-
tions." For complete text of this convention, see 6 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 203.
See Knauth, The Aviation Salvage at Sea Convention of 1938, 10 AIR L. REV. 146 (1939).
9. See, e.g., Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 629 (1887) (fixed dry-
dock not subject to salvage) ; but cf. Steamship Jefferson, 215 U.S. 130 (1909) (vessel
catching fire while under repair in dry dock held subject to a salvage award).
10. The Urko Mendi, 216 Fed. 427 (E.D. Pa. 1914); Boardman v. The Bethel, 3
Fed. Cas. 778, No. 1,585 (S.D.N.Y. 1849) ; The Phantom, 1 L.R. Adm. & Eccl. 58 (1866);
The Charlotte, 3 W. Rob. 68, 166 Eng. Rep. 888 (1848).
The fact that the peril is slight will not deprive the operation of its nature as a sal-
vage service, but will, of course, influence the amount awarded. Clayoquot Sound Can-
ning Co. Ltd. v. S.S. Princess Adelaide, 48 D.L.R. 478 (Ex. 1919) ; The Andrew Kelly
v. The Commodore, 48 D.L.R. 213 (Ex. 1919).
For analysis of elements to be considered in fixing the amount of a salvage award,
see The Toledo, 136 Fed. 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1905); The Lyman M. Law, 122 Fed. 816
(D. Me. 1903). See also KENNEDY, TEE LAW OF CIVIL SALVAGE 151 (3d ed. 1936).
11. "The whole theory of salvage is predicated upon the proposition that . . . there
is no legal duty to aid a thing or person who is in distress." RobiNsoN, op. cit. JUpra
note 4, at 722. See The Hope, 10 Pet. 108 (U.S. 1836). See also KENNEDY, op. cit. su pra
note 10, at 2.
12. The Annie Lord, 251 Fed. 157 (D. Mass. 1917); The Strathnevis, 76 Fed. 855
(D. Wash. 1896). Also see, The Blackwall, 10 Wall. 1, 12 (U.S. 1870).
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salvage are basic elements of public policy that recognize both the humani-
tarian need of aiding ships in distress, and the commercial importance of
maritime trade.'3
The antiquity of salvage is the antiquity of maritime trade itself.14 Since
the seas were the primary highways of commerce when maritime customs
were developing, merchants and traders influenced the evolution of maritime
law.15 The earliest maritime codes speak of salvage awards as proportions of
property saved, and give no consideration to any award for saving lives.10
The law of salvage was intended to motivate the saving of property for the
benefit of owner and salvor alike, and experience quickly proved a material
reward to be the most efficacious method of achieving that end. Consequently,
the salvor has a lien of highest priority upon the property saved, whether
ship or cargo.' 7 This lien accrues immediately upon the performance of the
service, and gives the salvor a right to proceed in rc;m against the property
itself.' s If necessary, the property may be sold, and the salvor may have his
claim satisfied from the proceeds of the sale.'0
This in rem association of the salvor's reward with the property saved
undermines the legal status of the life salvor. The mere mentioning of a
salvage award as a right in rem is sufficient to spell out the fundamental in-
compatibility involved in seeking to develop the life salvage concept.20 Eng-
land's Admiralty Court denied life salvage where no property had been saved,
because free bodies could not be valued.2 ' However, if life and property were
13. In The Star, 53 F.2d 890 (W.D. Wash. 1931), an alleged custom among fisher-
men to render reciprocal aid as a substitute for salvage was held contrary to public policy
since the court could not say that the incentive furnished by such custom was as strong
as the incentive furnished by the right to demand a salvage av.-ard in admiralty. Contra:
The Freeya v. The R.S., 59 D.L.R. 330 (Ex. 1921); 35 H~nv. L. R-v. 615 (1922).
In The Blaireau, 2 Cranch 240, 266 (U.S. 1804), the Court said: "The allowance of
a very ample compensation for [salvage] services . . . is intended as an inducement to
render them, which it is for the public interests, and for the general interests of humanity,
to hold forth to those who navigate the ocean.'
14. See SA lm=, ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH LUUTaaPE AND Counm .
LAw 26 (1930).
15. "[M]aritime law.., did not arise from the learning or speculations of theorists."
Putnam, The Remedy for Death at Sea, 22 CAsE & Con,.asmr 125 (1915).
16. See, e.g., AsHBU xER, THE RHODLUN SEA-LAw, cch xviii-ccXciii (1909).
17. The salvage lien may command precedence even over prior earned seamen's
wages. The Conveyor, 147 Fed. 5S6 (D. Ind. 1906) ; The Nettie Woodwrard, 50 Fed. 224
(E.D. Mich. 1892).
18. Canfield, Salvage, 22 CASE & Coisur.xr 118 (1915). See, The Charlotte Wylie,
2 V. Rob. 495, 166 Eng. Rep. 842 (1846).
19. CARV, CARRIGE OF GooDs BY SEA 485 (Sth ed., Henderson, 193s).
20. The lack of life salvage av.ards may be due to the fact that "the salvor could
hardly be allowed to detain the body of the person whom he saved... until the Salvage
was paid for his release." Knauth, Aviation and Salvage: The Application of Salvage
Priciples to Aircraft, 36 CoL- L. REV. 224, 228 (1936).
21. SANBORN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 15. For the origin of this rationale in Roman
law, see id. at 39. Also see The Zephyrus, 1 V. Rob. 329, 331 (1842) (jurisdiction of
19541
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saved simultaneously, the Court tended to give larger awards than if property
alone were saved.
22
Improving upon the general maritime law, the present law of life salvage in
Great Britain gives considerable recognition to the claims of life salvors. A
series of statutory enactments, 28 culminating in the Merchant Shipping Act
of 1894,24 has removed the barriers of general maritime law. The salvor of
life from a British vessel anywhere, or from a foreign vessel when the act
occurs wholly or in part in British waters, has an independent right to claim
a life salvage award.25 The award is based on the cost of the "actual expenses
incurred" in the life salvor's rescue operations plus "reasonable" compensa-
salvage court is founded solely upon a proceeding against property and not against the
person).
22. MACLACHLAN, MERCHANT SHIPPING 713 (5th ed., de Hart & Bucknill, 1911.).
23. The earliest statute to direct payment of a "reasonable reward" to properly sal-
vors was enacted in 1713. 13 Anne c. 21. Not until 1821, however, was the admiralty
court given power to award salvage for life saving apart from property saving. 1821,
1 & 2 Geo. IV, c. 46, § 8. See KENNEDY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 56. Compare The
Queen Mab, 3 Hagg. 242 (1835) (although no property was saved, an award was granted
for assistance in saving the lives of the crew), with The Zephyrus, 1 W. Rob. 329 (1842)
(unless property was salved, no award for life salving was possible).
Following The Zephyrus, a new statute provided that "every person . . . who shall
act ... in the saving ... of the life of any person on board ... shall ... be paid a reason-
able reward ... by way of salvage for such service.... " 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 99, § 19,
The Silver Bullion, 2 Spinks, E. & A. 70 (1854) (returning to The Queen Mab rule).
The 1846 Act was repealed since it failed to indicate either by whom or how payment
was to be made. Merchant Shipping Repeal Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 120, § 5. A new
statute clearly set forth the life salvage liability, indicated by whom it should be borne,
and gave a life salvage claim the highest priority. Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 17 &
18 Vict., c. 104, §§ 458, 459, The Coromandel, Swab. 205 (1857). A special fund was set
up to meet a life salvor's claim if property salved proved inadequate. See, e.g., The Cargo
ex Schiller, 2 P.D. 145, 158 (1877).
Even under the 1854 statute, however, it was still necessary for some property to be
saved, either by the life salvor or another salvor, for the life salvor to recover anything.
The Renpor, 8 P.D. 115 (1883). See also, The Mariposa, (1896) p. 273; MARSDEN,
LAW OF COLLISIONS AT SEA 130 (9th ed., Gibb, 1934) ; Dunlop, supra note 3, at 46. But
the 1854 statute was operative only for salvage rendered within three miles off the shore
of the United Kingdom. The Leda, Swab. 40 (1856). Because of this obvious defect,
the legislature responded with the Admiralty Court Jurisdiction Act, 1861, 24 Viet., c.
10, § 9, The Pacific, (1898) p. 170; The Cairo, 2 Asp. 257 (1874) (applicable to British
ships wherever they might be and to foreign ships in British waters) ; and the Merchant
Shipping Act Amendment Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 63, § 59 (extending the principle
of life salvage to foreign ships outside British waters if the foreign power was amenable
to British courts awarding salvage). But § 59 of the second act has been applied only to
Prussia. See Order in Council, April 7, 1864, saved by Merchant Shipping Act, 1894,
57 & 58 Vict., c. 60, § 745.
24. 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60.
25. "§ 544 (1) Where services are rendered wholly or in part within British waters
in saving life from any British or foreign vessel, or elsewhere in saving life from any
British vessel, there shall be payable to the salvor by the owner of the vessel, cargo, or
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tion.26 If vessel or other property is saved or later recovered by anyone,
these properties are subject to the life salvor's claim in proportion to their
value.2 7 Moreover, as against the owner of the surviving vessel, the life
salvor's award takes priority over all other claims for salvage ; as against
owners of all other surviving property, the award has at least equal standing
with other salvage claims. 29 The liability of owners of surviving property to
pay life salvage does not exceed the value of such property; however, there
is a qualified right to proceed in pcrsonam to the limit of the value of de-
fendant's interest in such property. 30 Where vessel and all other property
are lost, or where their surviving value is too small to satisfy the award
to the life salvor, the Board of Trade may pay the claim, in whole or part,
out of money provided by Parliament in a Mercantile Marine Fund.31
THu LIFE SALVOR IN AXERICA ADMIRALTY COURTS
Life salvage awards were made in a paradoxical fashion in colonial America.
Since slaves were regarded as property, their salvors were granted awards,a -
apparel saved, a reasonable amount of salvage, to be determined in case of dispute in
manner hereinafter mentioned.
"(2) Salvage in respect of the preservation of life when payable by the owners of the
vessel shall be payable in priority to all other claims for salvage.
"(3) Where the vessel, cargo and apparel are destroyed, or the value thereof is in-
sufficient, after payment of the actual expenses incurred, to pay the amount of salvage
payable in respect of the preservation of life, the Board of Trade may, in their discretion,
award to the salvor, out of the Mercantile Marine Fund, such sum as they think fit in
whole or part satisfaction of any amount of salvage left unpaid.
"§ 545. When it is made to appear to Her Majesty that the government of any foreign
country is willing that salvage should be awarded by British Courts for services rendered
in saving life from ships belonging to that country, when the ship is beyond the limits
of British jurisdiction, Her Majesty may, by order in Council, direct that the provisions
of the part of this Act with reference to salvage of life shall, subject to any conditions
and qualifications contained in the order, apply, and those provisions shall accordingly
apply to those services as if they were rendered in saving life from ships within British
jurisdiction." The Merchant Shipping Act of 1S94, 57 & 5S Vict, c. 60, §§ 544, 545.
These sections essentially re-enact the corresponding sections of the Merchant Shipping
Act, 1854, and its extensions by the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1861, § 9; and the Merchant
Shipping Act Amendment Act, 1862, § 59. See note 23 supra.
26. See note 25 supra.
27. The Longford, 6 P.D. 60 (18S0). Also see, LowNDFs & Rurompin, LAw or"
GEx mALx AvERAGEs 152 (7th ed. 1948).
28. See § 544(2), supra note 25.
29. The Cargo ex Sarpedon, 3 P.D. 28 (1877); The Cargo ex Schiller, 2 P.D. 145
(1877).
30. See, e.g., The Cargo ex Port Victor (1901) P. 243; Duncan v. Dundee Shipping
Co., 15 Scot. L.R. 429 (1878); The Cargo ex Schiller, 2 P.D. 145, 147 (1877). Also see
KEN E~y, op. cit. supra note 10, at 13 ct seq. The in personam remedy is resorted to
infrequently. See, e.g., Five Steel Barges, 15 P.D. 142 (1890); The Rapid, 3 Hag. Adm.
419 (1838) ; The Hope, 3 C. Rob. 215 (1801).
31, See § 544(3), supra note 25.
32. Flinn v. The Leander, 9 Fed. Cas. 275, No. 4,870 (D.S.C. IS); Jerby v. One
Hundred and Ninety-four Slaves, 13 Fed. Cas. 550, No. 7,288 (D.S.C. 1806); Bass v.
1954]
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apparently without courts' perceiving that they were thus indirectly encourag-
ing the saving of slaves in preference to freemen. While this policy might
have found favor in the eyes of the early abolitionists, it could hardly have
been the intention of the jurist or the slave owner (sometimes the same
person). Yet, trapped by mores and law that made men chattels, the courts
were compelled to make remuneration to those who saved slaves, since
slaves had a market value while freemen did not.88 The life salvage problem
thus appeared indirectly in early America as a problem of "property" salvage.
But the life salvage doctrine in America inexplicably failed to duplicate
the English development. Although our courts cast envious glances across
the Atlantic toward the English recognition of the life salvor,84 they felt
compelled to adhere, in the absence of legislation, to the established general
maritime rule that the saving of life alone could not be rewarded. 85 Of course,
when a life salvor saved property too, the courts could be more generous.80
But even here, the judiciary realized that remedial legislation was both neces-
sary and desirable; they were reluctant to take more of A's property to re-
ward B for having saved C.37 Failure to provide the required legislation
must be placed at Congress' doorstep.
The Present Life Salvage Statute:
Concomitant with United States ratification of the International Salvage
Convention, 38 Congress enacted the present law on life salvage. Under the
SalVage Act of 1912:
"Salvors of human life who have taken part in the services
rendered on the occasion of the accident, giving rise to salvage
Five Negroes, 2 Fed. Cas. 1006, No. 1,093 (D.S.C. 1803) ; see also, RECORDS OF THE Vim-
ADMIRALTY COURT OF RHODE ISLAND, 1716-1752 p. 226 (Towle ed. 1936); REPORTS OF
CASES IN THE VIcE-ADMIRALTY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK AND IN THE COURT OF
ADMIRALTY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1715-1788 p. 73 (Hough ed. 1925); MARVIN,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WRECK AND SALVAGE 240 (1858).
33. See The Mulhouse, 17 Fed. Cas. 962, 967, No. 9,910 (D.Fla. 1859).
34. See The Plymouth Rock, 9 Fed. 413, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1881); Lamar v. Penelope,
14 Fed. Cas. 977, No. 8,007 (E.C. S.C. 1858).
35. See cases cited note 34 supra. It is perhaps significant that an early American
treatise on maritime law, although discussing the seaman's right to salvage, is silent on
the question of life salvage or the right thereto. See CuRTs, A TEArTIsE oN TR RIGHTS
AND DUnES OF MERCHANT SEAMEN (1841).
36. The saving of life "forms an essential ingredient where the question of compen-
sation is under consideration." The Edith L. Allen, 139 Fed. 888, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1905).
Also see The Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, 106 Fed. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1901); The Emblem,
8 Fed. Cas. 611, No. 4,434 (D.Me. 1840).
However, despite such statements a recent comprehensive study of salvage awards
apparently concludes that the difference in the assessment where property alone, and
Where both property and lives are salved, is of "a comparatively minor nature." See
SUTTON, THE ASSESSING OF SALVAGE AWARDS 576, 577 (1949).
37. Ibid.
38. See 6 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 6.
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or assistance, are entitled to a fair share of the remuneration
awarded to the salvors of the vessel, her cargo, and acces-
sories. ' 39
Thus worded, this statute "merely perpetuates the previous rule that property
must be saved if the salvors of life are to get anything, and that the salvors
get their reward out of the property saved. 40 Moreover, even if property
is saved, the life salvage must take place "on the occasion of" such saving.
judicial interpretation of the statute did not enhance the status of the life
salvor.
The It re St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co.41 decision limited the right of a
life salvor to receive a life salvage award. When an excursion vessel, the
Eastland, sank at its dock in the Chicago River on July 24, 1915, more than
800 persons were killed. The loss of life would have been even greater
were it not for the "magnificent and heroic efforts of the life salvors" who
bent every effort to save as many of the passengers and crew as possible.4 2
Since the Eastland's owner was legally obligated to raise and remove her
quickly, a "no cure, no pay" salvage contract was concluded with the Great
Lakes Towing Company on July 27, and the vessel was raised by August 6.3
As the life salvors had contributed nothing to the saving of property, it vas
conceded that apart from statute they had no claim. The court was faced
with deciding whether the life salvors were entitled, under the statute, to a
share of the contract remuneration made to the towing company.
The court denied the life salvors' claims on several grounds. First, the
life salvors had not filed their claims within the period set by the statute.44
Secondly, the court construed the statute as not granting an award to a life
salvor if the life salvage or the property salvaged did not occur "during the
period of peril."45 Since the services of the Towing company occurred a
considerable time after the period of peril, the life salvors could not come
under the statute.46 Moreover, since the life salvors could not have saved
39. 37 STAT. 242 (1912) ; 46 U.S.C. § 729 (1946). The purpose of this statute was
to harmonize United States' law with the provisions of the "salvage treaty adopted at
the Third International Conference on Maritime Law held at Brussels in 1910." The
Impoco, 287 Fed. 400, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
40. Roi-so-, op. cit. supra note 4, at 718.
41. 262 Fed. 535 (N.D. Ill. 1919).
42. Id. at 536.
43. Id. at 537.
44. Id. at 541-5.
45. Id. at 541. See note 53 infra.
46. "The services rendered in the saving of lives were to be considered when re-
muneration for salvage was awarded, so that they might participate in and be given a
part of any sum paid for saving the vessel or other property. In such a case, the life
salvor, by zirtue of his service rendered at the time that the property was sa-cd, became
a cosalvor, with a right to recover compensation for a service, when under the general
maritime law, he would get nothing.... It was not intended that, as between different -ets
of salvors, the life salvor was to participate in awards which might be made for services
1954]
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the Eastland, they were not life salvors which the statute was intended to
reward, namely, those who might otherwise be tempted to devote their efforts
to save the vessel, leaving the people to perish.47 The court found compensation
for these salvors on a spiritual level: "What they did was inspired by the
spirit which since Christendom has been the foundation of the great brother-
hood of mankind. . . . Their reward they have; it can never be taken from
them, and it is measured by a standard greater than money."
48
One must perforce sympathize with any jurist who finds the law in such
a state that he must resort to sermonizing in order to rationalize his decision.
Not tempted by evil, the life salvors could not, under the statute, be rewarded
for doing good. Moreover, bad the life salvors here felt that "virtue is its own
reward," they would not have taken affirmative action to obtain a more
material manifestation of virtue. Rewards "greater than money" are not
within the province of admiralty courts to dispense.
The scope of the statute was further restricted in The Admiral Evans.
49
Libellant brought an in rein action against a salved vessel to recover for ser-
vices rendered and damages suffered by his vessels which had participated
in the removal of passengers, baggage and mail. The court denied an award
on the ground that since libellant did not participate in salvaging the vessel,
no claim could be asserted against it either for rescuing passengers or for
salvaging cargo.5 0 The court interpreted the statute as placing "human life
and property on a par to excite interest of salvors to save life, as well as ship
and cargo, but [that] to warrant award for saving life a salvage claim must
exist against the ship or cargo."'' Since the life salvage claim in this action
was asserted against the vessel, and since this claim, like that for salvaging
cargo, failed because libellant did not participate in salvaging the vessel, the
statute was worthless to the life salvor.
52
The Admiral Evans reveals the practical inadequacy of our present legisla-
tion. According to the court, congressional intent was to place "life and
property on a par." But life can not be placed on a par with property if the
life salvage award depends upon some property being saved. Any would-be
life salvor motivated primarily by hope of gain would initially save property,
or assist in the saving of property, to assure the existence of an adequate
salvage fund. Having thus assured himself of a source for a salvage award,
he might then turn to saving life in order to enhance his share of the award.
Only by making the life salvage award independent of the necessity for any
rendered months, and even years, after the life-saving service had been performed." Id.
at 540-1 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 539, 540.
48. Id. at 540.
49. 286 Fed. 442 (W.D. Wash. 1923).
50. Id. at 443.
51. Ibid.
52. Benedict suggests that The Admiral Evans raises the possibility of a remedy
in personam existing in life salvage cases, but finds no authority for such position. See
1 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 338 n.23.
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property salvage can the saving of life be made the monetary equal of the
saving of property.5a
New legislation:
An independent status for the life salvor in America requires new legisla-
tion. This legislation might parallel British statutes on the subject, but it
should, where feasible, go beyond British law in order to enact comprehensive
inducements which would encourage life salvage endeavors. Fortunately, such
endeavors are today required with growing infrequency, but when they are
required, the stakes are as great as they ever were. Remedial legislation
should remove effectively any temptation to save property rather than life, and
should recognize that a life salvor may be in greater peril saving lives than
saving property.54 This means that the life salvage award must be completely
adequate, reasonably certain, and independent of the contingency of property
survival. And, where the life salvor contributes in any Nway to property
salvage, his property salvage rights should not be affected by his life salvage
claim. Moreover, the statute should provide for reimbursement of the life
salvor for any expenses or losses incurred in the course of operations directed
primarily toward saving persons. 5
Since the life salvor should be rewarded even if no property survives, the
statute must provide a new source for his remuneration. The persons saved
are a possible source of payment, for they are the direct recipients of the
life salvor's efforts. While Article 9 of the Salvage Convention specified
that "no remuneration is due from the persons whose lives are saved," it
then added, "nothing in this Article shall affect the provisions of the national
laws on this subject."' 0 Although the present life salvage statute is silent
in this regard,"7 Article 9 apparently acknowledges the possibility of future
national legislation holding the rescued financially liable. One commentator
has strongly urged that the persons saved be personally liable, arguing that
ascertaining the proper award would be no more difficult than estimating
damages in a wrongful death action, and that this award should not be paid
by a shipowner "who, in many cases, is in no way benefited" by the life
salvage.
5 8
53. In The Shreveport, 42 F.2d 524 (E.D. S.C. 1930), the court avarded the Aldecoa
$5,000 as life salvage for having taken off the crew of the burning Shreveport The
Shreveport was salvaged later the same day by the Mariners Harbor after the Aldecoa
had left the scene. The court held that the statute should be "liberally construed with the
humane object in view" and found that the life salvage services were rendered "on the
occasion of the accident giving rise to salvage." But cf. The Doctor George J. Moser,
55 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Barge 592--Delroy, 1938 Am. Mar. Cas. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
54. RoBINsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 717. For the consideration to be given to the
element of danger to the lives of the salvors in fixing the amount of a salvage award,
see The Toledo, 136 Fed. 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1905).
55. See note 8 s Ipra.
56. INT'l SALVAGE CONVENTI N Art. 9 (1910).
57. The otherwise comprehensive life salvage provisions of the Aviation Salvage at
Sea Convention of 1933, see note 8 supra, are equally silent in this respect.
58 Cunningham, Life Salvage, 17 GREzx BAG 703, 709 (1905).
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This solution is beguiling in its simplicity, and must be rejected. 0 If the
person saved is financially unable to pay a reward, the life salvor is left
empty-handed after performing a service in the public interest. Moreover, in
assessing damages in wrongful death actions the heirs' loss is in issue, and
this is far different from a humiliating evaluation of living persons in mone-
tary terms. And finally, it is doubtful that a shipowner is "in no way bene-
fited" by life salvage. Both ship and cargo owners are potential benefactors of
prompt life salvage. 60 The removal of passengers conceivably may permit
more expeditious and effective rendering of property salvage services. And
while any effort to increase the attractiveness of services to life rather than
to property contains a latent financial disadvantage for property owners and
their underwriters, an enlightened "just regard" for the general interest of
maritime commerce cannot permit indifference to any plan to further the
safety of passengers and crew.61
If the reward is not to be paid by the persons saved, the maritime property
owners must bear the expense of life salvage remuneration. The salvage rela-
tionship between the United States Coast Guard and these property owners
offers a feasible method of distributing this burden.6 2 Since the extensive
salvage services of the Coast Guard do not bring any award to the Govern-
ment, it is not surprising that, whenever expedient, "shipmasters in trouble
try to wait for the Coast Guard's free aid."63 Furthermore, when a Coast
Guard vessel and a private salvor both participate in a salvage operation, the
share of the award which would normally go to the Coast Guard vessel
remains with the owner of the property saved, constituting in effect a gift of
the government. 4 Since the American public contributes to the saving of his
59. See 19 HARv. L. REv. 310 (1906) (review of Cunningham, note 58 supra).
60. "If any definite value had to be put on the saving of life, a possible standard
would be that of the shipowner's liability for the loss of life. With the crew, this would
ordinarily be that of the Workmen's Compensation Acts, with passengers ordinarily no
liability at all. Given, however, some prior actionable fault on the shipowner's part, the
basis of which would be different as between passengers and crew, the liability in both
cases would be that for common law damages." See SuTtoN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 45.
61. "The ground ... for charging the ship with the payment of salvage of life is not
the actual benefit received by the shipowner in the particular case. The same reasoning
applies to cargo .... But the direct benefit is not the sole principle upon which salvage
reward is required to be paid .... Salvage is governed by a due regard to benefits re-
ceived, combined with a just regard for the general interests of ships and marine com-
merce." The Fusilier, 1 Br. & L. 341, 347 (1865).
62. The Coast Guard is authorized to cruise upon the coast in the season of severe
weather and "afford such aid to distressed navigators as their circumstances may re-
quire." 5 STAT. 208 (1837), 14 U.S.C. § 53 (1946). The Coast Guard's "cutters cruise
in quiet seasons as well as stormy and the extension of its. free services in the more
crowded waters throughout the year has tended to discredit the professional and amateur
salvor in the public eye; the professional salvor seems to survive only for the heavier
jobs which the Coast Guard does not undertake." Knauth, supra note 20, at 244.
63. Id. at 245.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Central Wharf Towboat Co., 3 F.2d 250, 251 (1st Cir.
1924); The Kanawa, 254 Fed. 762, 764 (2d Cir. 1918); The Borgfred, 1936 Am. Mar.
Cas. 804, 810 (D.C. Virg. Is.).
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property, the owner can hardly be heard to complain should he be required to
pay a relatively small sum into a fund established to give greater security
to the members of that public when they travel by sea.
The presently gratuitous services rendered by the Coast Guard should be
the source of income for a United States Life Salvage Fund. When the Coast
Guard renders successful salvage services to maritime property under circum-
stances which would justify a salvage award had the services been rendered
by a private party, the owner of such salved property should pay one per-
cent of its reasonable value into a United States Life Salvage Fund. Since
private salvage awards, at the extreme low range of the scale, generally run
from two to five percent,6 5 the one percent required would still leave the
property owner in an advantageous position when the Coast Guard rather than
a private salvor aids his vessel.
The power of the United States Government to demand remuneration for
salvage services rendered by its vessels is not to be denied."C The payment
into the Fund, however, would not be a change in the traditional policy of
the Government not to demand salvage payment for services rendered by
Coast Guard vessels and their personnel. It would not be a salvage award
in any accurate sense, because the element of voluntariness is lacldng in the
case of the Coast Guard6 7 and because the amount of the payment would not
be subject to such variable elements as the efforts, peril and skill of the salvor,
and the value of the salvor's equipments The payment would be closer to a
fee paid into a special fund for a special maritime purpose, and might be viewed
as a measure of repayment by the American shipowner to the American tax-
payer for the monetary benefits conferred in the form of governmental subsidies
and other assistance.
CONCLUSION
The injustice inherent in the present American law of life salvage is mani-
fest; remedial legislation is necessary. It is submitted that the following
65. See Knauth, mpra note 8, at 226; tables set forth in SuTrro,, op. di. supra note
36, at 74 el seq.
66. "The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to cause vessels under his control
adapted to the purpose to afford salvage service to public or private vessels in distress;
Provided, That when such salvage service is rendered by a vessel specially equipped for
the purpose or by a tug, the Secretary of the Navy may determine and collect reasonable
compensation therefor!' 40 STAT. 705 (1918), 34 U.S.C. §472 (1946).
In The Omaha, 71 F. Supp. 314 (D.P.R. 1947), affd mb nom. Hamburg-American
Line v. United States, 168 F2d 47 (1st Cir. 1948), members of a U.S. Naval vessel's
crew boarded a German merchant vessel, whose crew had scuttled and abandoned her,
and were awarded salvage in actions in rem filed in their behalf by the United States.
See The Impoco, 287 Fed. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
67. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
63. For the variable elements to be invoked in awarding a traditional salvage claim,
see The Toledo, 136 Fed. 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1905); The Lyman M. Law, 122 Fed. 816
(D. Me. 1903) ; KnICNNy, op. di. supra note 10, at 151.
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statute embodies the essentials required to remedy the anomalies of the present
law:
Section I. Life Salvor Remuneration: Award and Reimbursement
(a) Salvors of human life from any vessel whose services are
rendered wholly or in part within the navigable waters of the
United States, its territories or possessions, or from a vessel of
United States registry anywhere on the high seas, shall be entitled
to a reasonable award as life salvage remuneration regardless of
whether the vessel, cargo or any other property shall survive the
distaster giving rise to such life salvage services, and without con-
sideration of any requirement that such salvors of human life
render salvage services of any kind to the vessel, cargo, or any
other property which may survive the said disaster.
(b) Any person shall also be entitled to reimbursement for any
expenses or losses which are directly attributable to life salvage
endeavors, whether successful or not.0 9
Section II. Procedure
(a) The Secretary of Commerce is authorized and directed to
establish a United States Life Salvage Administration Board to
consist of three members, one representative each from the Coast
Guard, the Maritime Administration, and the federal judiciary.
This Board shall be empowered, under such rules and regulations
as it may prescribe, to ascertain a reasonable award and reimburse-
ment on any occasion where no vessel, cargo or other property
survives the disaster giving rise to the life salvage claim, or where
the vessel, cargo, or other property so surviving shall be of insuf-
ficient value for life salvage remuneration.
(b) When vessel, cargo and other property fail to survive the
distaster, or when the value of surviving vessel, cargo or other
property is insufficient for award and reimbursement, a life salvor
may file a claim for remuneration with the Board. Any remunera-
tion so received shall be deemed in lieu of any right to claim award
or reimbursement from any other source70
Section III. Ascertaining Award and Reimbursement
(a) In determining the amount of life salvage award, the Board
shall consider the following factors:
69. This section would not apply to life salvage rendered to foreign vessels outside
American territorial waters, unless some agreement for reciprocity existed, as provided
for in British law. See note 23 suepra.
70. This section enables a life salvor, where no property survives the disaster, to seek
a life salvage award by direct administrative procedure. It is contemplated that if any
property survives, the life salvor will exercise his right to intervene in the property sal-
vage proceedings for his reward. If, however, a life salvor is denied an award in these
proceedings because of insufficiency of surviving property, he may then apply to the
Board for an adequate award. Similarly, the life salvor may in the first instance seek
award and reimbursement from the Board on the ground that the surviving property is
of insufficient value to sustain adequate remuneration; but if the Board finds that the
surviving property is sufficient in value and that the life salvor can intervene in property
salvage proceedings it may dismiss the administrative claim.
[Vol, 63 :779
THE LIFE SALVOR PROBLEM
1) The degree of success as measured by the number of persons
saved;
2) The personal danger encountered by the salvor, and prop-
erty risks run;
3) The time expended in the operation;
4) The value of the salvor's property engaged in the operation;
5) Any and all other factors which the Board, in its discretion,
deems just and equitable for evaluating the life salvage services
rendered.
(b) Any life salvage award made in accordance with the pro-
visions of Section III(a) may have added to it a sum designated
by the Board as reimbursement for the necessary expenses and
losses incurred by the life salvor on the occasion giving rise to
such life salvage award.
71
Section IV. United States Life Salvage Fund
(a) Payment of any life salvage a-ward or reimbursement, as
ascertained by the United States Life Salvage Administration
Board, shall be made from a United States Life Salvage Fund.
(b) The income for the Fund shall be derived in the following
manner:
1) Whenever a salvage service shall be rendered in whole
or in part by the United States Coast Guard to maritime
property, under such circumstances as would entitle a private
person to a salvage award, the owner of this property shall pay
a sum equal to one percent of its salved value into the Fund.
2) If, in any fiscal year, payments into the Fund shall prove
inadequate for life salvage remuneration granted by the Board,
Congress may appropriate, in the public interest, such sum as
may be required to meet the deficiency. Any sums so appro-
priated shall be repaid into the Treasury of the United States
when, in the opinion of the Board, there exists in the Fund a
surplus sufficient to warrant such repayment. -
3) The United States shall have a maritime lien of the highest
priority on any property salved by the Coast Guard to insure
payment into the Fund in accordance with the terms of this
Section. This lien may be enforced in the courts of the United
States in the same manner as any other salvage lien.
Section V. Nothing contained in any of the foregoing provisions
shall be construed as authorizing the Board to award any salvage re-
muneration to the Coast Guard itself, nor to any of its personnel
when acting in performance of their duty to assist and save life and
property in peril.
71. The above criteria should assure that the standards used by the Board vill not
greatly differ from those used by the judiciary in fixing salvage awards. See sources
cited note 6S supra.
72. The figure of one percent may prove to be too high, and experience may permit
a reduction of this already modest amount. For example, in the fiscal year ending June
30, 1949, the total value of vessels and cargoes assisted by the U.S. Coast Guard was
$199,5S6,895. See Src'v TREAs. REP. No. 3162 p. 172 (1950). In that year, apprw.%i-
mately $2,000,000 would have been available for a Life Salvage Fund.
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